We show that feasible elimination procedures (Peleg, 1978) can be used to select k from m alternatives. An important advantage of this method is the core property: no coalition can guarantee an outcome that is preferred by all its members. We also provide an axiomatic characterization for the case k = 1, using the conditions of anonymity, Maskin monotonicity, and independent blocking. Finally, we show for any k that outcomes of feasible elimination procedures can be computed in polynomial time, by showing that the problem is computationally equivalent to finding a maximal matching in a bipartite graph.
Introduction
The Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem (Gibbard, 1973, and Satterthwaite, 1975) says that for every non-dictatorial social choice function whose range contains at least three alternatives, sincere voting is not a dominant strategy. Closely related to this, we obtain that for every non-dictatorial social choice function there exists a situation where either there exists no Nash equilibrium or the sincere outcome is not the unique Nash equilibrium outcome (see Theorem 2.1).Thus, one of the problems that a designer of voting schemes faces is strategic distortion of the outcome. This has led one of the authors (Peleg, 1978) to introduce the class of so-called exactly and strongly consistent social choice functions, which resist distortion to a large extent. Indeed, for an exactly and strongly consistent social choice function the sincere outcome is always an outcome of a strong Nash equilibrium of the associated voting game. Of course, the sincere outcome may not be the unique outcome of a strong Nash equilibrium; however, it will always belong to the core of the relevant voting game. The foregoing paper has been followed by several investigations of the set of exactly and strongly consistent social choice functions: Dutta and Pattanaik (1978) , Polishchuk (1978) , Ishikawa and Nakamura (1980) , Oren (1981) , Kim and Roush (1981) , Holzman (1986) , and Peleg and Peters (2006) . Also the books of Peleg (1984) , Abdou and Keiding (1991) , and Peleg and Peters (2010) have chapters devoted to consistent voting.
The central tool, introduced in Peleg (1978) , to obtain exactly and strongly consistent social choice functions is the concept of a feasible elimination procedure. In such a procedure, applied to a profile of preferences, alternatives are eliminated one by one, until a final alternative remains: this is called a maximal alternative. In this paper we use this procedure to select not just one, but also k > 1 alternatives, simply by taking the last k instead of only the last alternative. We show that for at least two extensions of voters' preferences over the alternatives to (ordered) k-tuples of alternatives, this method has the core property: no coalition can guarantee an outcome (k-tuple) that is preferred by all its members. Formally, this core is defined as the core of the effectivity function induced by this method. We show, by an example, that some well-known existing methods (single transferable vote, plurality, plurality with run-off) violate the core property.
We also provide an axiomatic characterization of the social choice correspondence which assigns the maximal alternatives to each profile, using the conditions of anonymity, Maskin monotonicity, and independent blocking.
Finally, we show that the problem of determining whether a specific k-tuple can result from a feasible elimination procedure is computationally equivalent to the problem of finding a maximal matching in a bipartite graph. The latter problem can be solved in polynomial time (Hopkroft and Karp, 1973) . Section 2 presents basic definitions and preliminary results, and Section 3 the axiomatic characterization of the social choice correspondence assigning maximal alternatives. In Section 4 we consider the extension to choosing k from m, and in Section 5 we show that this method is polynomial. Section 6 concludes.
Notations
The following basic notations are used throughout. For a set D, |D| denotes the cardinality of D, P (D) the power set, i.e., the set of all subsets of D, and P 0 (D) the set of all nonempty subsets of D.
Preliminaries
Let A be a set of m alternatives, m ≥ 2, and let N = {1, . . . , n}, n ≥ 2, be a set of voters. Denote by L the set of all linear orderings 1 of A. A social choice function (SCF) is a function F : L N → A. If R N ∈ L N is a profile of preferences of the voters and F is an SCF, then the pair (F, R N ) defines an ordinal n-person game in strategic form, in which each player (voter) has strategy set L, F determines the outcome (alternative), and this outcome is evaluated by R i for each player i ∈ N . As usual, the profile Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem (Gibbard, 1973; Satterthwaite, 1975) states that if an SCF is nonmanipulable and its range contains at least three alternatives, then it is dictatorial. Thus, if an SCF F is non-dictatorial and surjective and m ≥ 3, then F is manipulable; that is, there exists a preference profile R N that is not an NE of the game (F, R N ).
A social choice correspondence (SCC) is a function H : L N → P 0 (A). We do not distinguish between the SCF F and the SCC
). Requiring that F is not distorted seems a weakening of nonmanipulability. However, we have:
Theorem 2.1. If an SCF F is not distorted and its range contains at least three alternatives, then it is dictatorial.
Proof. Suppose F is not distorted. Then it implements itself by Nash equilibria. Hence it is Maskin monotonic (see, e.g., Peleg, 1984 , Lemma 6.5.1). Thus, by Muller and Satterthwaite (1977) F is dictatorial.
An SCC H is Paretian if for all x, y ∈ A and R N ∈ L N , if x = y and yR i x for all i ∈ N , then x / ∈ H(R N ). A family of SCFs that are non-dictatorial and Paretian and 'not easily distorted' was suggested in Peleg (1978) . First we need a few definitions.
An SCC H is anonymous if for all R N ∈ L N and for all permutations π of N , H(R 1 , . . . , R n ) = H(R π(1) , . . . , R π(n) ). Peleg (1978) proposed the following method, leading to an important class of anonymous ESC SCFs.
It is not difficult to see that there exists always at least one f.e.p. under the assumptions in the definition. Henceforth in this paper we assume n+1 ≥ m. An
M is an anonymous and Paretian social choice correspondence. 2 It may also be shown that it is Maskin monotonic (see, e.g., Peleg and Peters, 2010, Theorem 9.3.6; or Lemma 5.2 below). Hence, it admits an anonymous, Paretian, and monotonic selection.
, and R N is obtained from Q N by improving the position of x and leaving the relative positions of all other alternatives intact, then x = F (R N ).) For instance, one may select from M (R N ) according to a given fixed ordering in L. This is important in view of the following result (see, e.g., Peleg and Peters, 2010, Theorem 9.2.6).
Theorem 2.5. Every selection from M is ESC.
In order to formulate the converse to Theorem 2.5 we need the following definition.
With a map β as in Definition 2.4 we associate the EF E β by defining
An EF is anonymous if E(S) depends only on |S| for all S. Clearly, E β is anonymous. An EF may be considered as the coalition function a la von Neumann and Morgenstern of some game form. In particular, if F is a surjective SCF then its EF E F is defined by
2 Clearly, M depends on β, but this is suppressed from notation if no confusion is likely.
We now have the following converse of Theorem 2.5 (see Corollary 9.3.4 and Theorem 9.3.5 in Peleg and Peters, 2010) .
It can be shown (see Example 10.5.4 in Peleg and Peters, 2010) that if an SCF F is ESC and has an anonymous EF E F without vetoers, then there is a β (with β(x) ≥ 2 for all x ∈ A) such that E F = E β . Thus, by varying β with this additional property, all ESC SCF's with anonymous EF and without vetoers are obtained in Theorem 2.7. In other words, if there are no vetoers, then every ESC social choice function is based on feasible elimination procedures.
An axiomatic characterization of M
We shall give in this section an axiomatic characterization of the SCC M . First, we need some new concepts. Let H :
We also need the following definition. Let E :
, is the set of all alternatives that are not dominated at R N .
For an SCC H we define the function E H * : P (N ) → P (P 0 (A)) as follows. Let S ∈ P 0 (N ) and B ∈ P 0 (A).
Otherwise, we define b(B) = n + 1. We also define b(∅) = 0. Note that b(A) = n + 1. Clearly, these blocking coefficients are well-defined for any SSC H; a blocking coefficient b(B) is the minimum size of a coalition that can make sure that the outcomes under H are in the complement A\B by reporting preferences where B is the bottom part.
We can now state our characterization result. 3 The function E H * is called the first effectivity function of H (Peleg, 1984 
Thus, b(B) = β(B) for all B ∈ P 0 (A), and the proof of the implication 2) ⇒ 1) is complete.
We now prove the implication 1) ⇒ 2). So let H be anonymous, Maskin monotonic, and independently blocking with coefficients β(x), x ∈ A. Then for these blocking coefficients β(x), M is well defined.
Let
. Then there exists an f.e.p. (x 1 , C 1 ; . . . ; x m−1 , C m−1 ; x) with respect to R N . Let now Q N be the profile that is obtained from R N by lowering x j to the bottom of R i for all i ∈ C j and for j = 1, . . . , m − 1, and leaving everything else intact. By the definition of blocking coefficients, H(Q N ) ⊆ A\{x j } for all j = 1, . . . , m−1, so that H(Q N ) = {x}. Finally, since xR i x j for all i ∈ C j and j = 1, . . . , m − 1, and since H is Maskin monotonic, x ∈ H(R N ).
For the reverse inclusion, let x ∈ H(R N ). It is sufficient to prove that Peleg and Peters (2010) . Suppose there is an S ∈ P (N ) and B ∈ E β (S) with x / ∈ B, such that yR i x for all i ∈ S and y ∈ B. For each i ∈ S let Q i ∈ L be a preference with yQ i z ⇔ yR i z for all y, z ∈ A\B and with yQ i z for all y ∈ B and z ∈ A\B.
On the other hand, x ∈ H(R N ) and
Maskin monotonicity of H imply x ∈ H(Q S , R N \S ), a contradiction. Hence,
We now show that the three properties in Theorem 3.1 are logically independent. It is not difficult to see that there exist anonymous selections from M : e.g., take Q ∈ L and let F (R N ) be the alternative of M (R N ) that is maximal according to Q. Such selections will be independently blocking by Theorem 2.7. However, they cannot be Maskin monotonic (if m ≥ 3) because of Muller and Satterthwaite (1977) -see the proof of Theorem 2.1. Also, the Pareto correspondence is anonymous and Maskin monotonic, but it is not independently blocking: b(B) = n for every B ∈ P 0 (A), B = A. For the independence of anonymity we consider the following example. 
Choosing k from m
In this section we show how the concept of a feasible elimination procedure can be used to select not just one alternative, but an ordered k-tuple of alternatives -where 1 ≤ k ≤ m − 1. We show, in particular, that the resulting method has the core property: there is no subset of voters that can vote strategically in order to guarantee a better outcome for all its members. This is in contrast to some well-known existing methods that can be used for choosing k from msee Example 4.4.
Formally, let k ∈ {1, . . . , m} and denote byĀ k the set
As before, assume that n+ 1 ≥ m and let β : A → N satisfy x∈A β(x) = n+1. For these weights, we define M k :
there is an f.e.p. (x 1 , C 1 ; . . . ; x m−1 , C m−1 ; x m ) such that (y 1 , . . . , y k ) = (x m−k+1 , . . . , x m ). In words, M k assigns to a preference profile all tuples of k last alternatives in any f.e.p. for that profile. Clearly, M 1 = M . Define the function E M k : P (N ) → P (P 0 (Ā k )) by E M k (∅) = ∅ and, for S = ∅ and B k ∈Ā k :
Since, in particular,
, we have that E M k is an effectivity function: it is the effectivity function associated with M k . In this paper we consider two kinds of preferences of the voters for k-tuples. Both kinds of preferences extend the original preferences in L to linear orderings onĀ k . In the first extension we respect the order of a k-tuple and lexicographically compare alternatives, starting from the last one. Formally we have:
(P1) Let R ∈ L. Then forx = (x 1 , . . . , x k ) ∈Ā k andȳ = (y 1 , . . . , y 
In the second extension we ignore the order of a k-tuple and lexicographically compare alternatives, starting from the worst one. Formally we have:
(P2) Let R ∈ L. Forx = (x 1 , . . . , x k ) ∈Ā k andȳ = (y 1 , . . . , y k ) ∈Ā k reorder the alternatives so that x i 1 R . . . Rx i k and y j 1 R . . . Ry j k . Then we definē
Preference extension P1 could apply, for instance, if a president and a vicepresident of a society have to be chosen (k = 2). Then we first compare the candidates for president and, in case these are equal, we compare the candidates for vice-president. Extension P2 could apply when the members of a board to be chosen are on equal foot. Then we first compare the worst candidates. If these are the same, then we compare second worst candidates, etc. 5
Let E k : P (N ) → P (P 0 (Ā k )) be an effectivity function and letR N be a profile of linear orderings onĀ k . Then the core C(E k ,R N ) is defined in the usual way. We will now show that M k selects only core alternatives under both preference extension (P1) and preference extension (P2), starting with the latter.
Theorem 4.1. Let R N ∈ L N , and letR N be the profile of extended preferences according to (P2) .
Proof. Consider an f.e.p. f * = (x 1 , C 1 ; . . . ;
We derive a contradiction, which completes the proof of the theorem.
Let K = {x m−k+1 , . . . , x m } and let B = {x ∈ A : x ∈ {y 1 , . . . , y k } for some (y 1 , . . . , y k ) ∈ B k }.
Note that B \ K = ∅, otherwise we would have B = K, which is not possible in view of the preferences of the voters in S. Consider any x j ∈ B \ K, andȳ = (y 1 , . . . , y k ) ∈ B k with y = x j for some ∈ {1, . . . , k}. Sincē yR i (x m−k+1 , . . . , x m ) for all i ∈ S, by (P2) there is for each i ∈ S an x h ∈ K with x j R i x h . Since x j is eliminated according to f * prior to the alternatives of K, this implies that C j ∩ S = ∅. Hence, the alternatives of B \ K are eliminated according to f * via only voters in N \ S. Therefore we have |N \ S| ≥ β(B \ K) . ≥ β(B \ K) ). Then, for this specific profile (Q S , V N \S ), there is an f.e.p. in which all alternatives of B \ K are eliminated first. This implies that the resulting k-tuple, sayȳ, of B k can only contain alternatives of K, contradictingȳR i (x m−k+1 , . . . , x m ) for all i ∈ S.
Theorem 4.2. Let R N ∈ L N , and letR N be the profile of extended preferences according to (P1).
Proof. Let f * , S, B k , and Q S be as in the proof of Theorem 4.1. The proof proceeds in several steps.
Step 1 Let
x j = y k for some (y 1 , . . . , y k ) ∈ B k }. . . .
Step k Let {x, y, z}, N = {1, . . . , 4}, β(x) = 1, and β(y) = β(z) = 2. Consider the profile R N given in the following table:
according to preference assumption (P2). First, (x, y) is top-ranked for voter 4. Voter 3 only prefers (x, z) or (z, x) to (x, y) but this is not the case for voters 1 and 2. However, voter 3 alone is not effective for {(x, z), (z, x)}. Finally, voters 1 and 2 only prefer (y, z) and (z, y) to (x, y), but {1, 2} is not effective for {(y, z), (z, y)}. We conclude that (x, y) is in C(E M 2 ,R N ) under assumption (P2). Now consider preference assumption (P1). We claim that (x, y) is still in C(E M 2 ,R N ). Voter 4 finds (z, x) and (y, x) better than (x, y); also voter 3 finds (z, x) and (y, x) better than (x, y), but voters 1 and 2 prefer (x, y) over (z, x) and (y, x), and {3, 4} is not effective for {(z, x), (y, x)}: e.g., {1, 2} can put x at bottom so that x can be eliminated first. Voter 3 prefers every alternative in the set {(y, x), (z, x), (y, z), (x, z)} to (x, y), but 1 and 2 prefer only (z, y) over (x, y), and {3} is not effective for {(y, x), (z, x), (y, z), (x, z)}: {1, 2, 4} can put x and z at bottom so that y ends up last. Finally, {1, 2} is not effective for {(z, y)}: e.g., {3, 4} can put z at bottom so that z can be eliminated first. We conclude that (x, y) is in C(E M 2 ,R N ) also under assumption (P1).
The fact that M k satisfies the core property as in Theorems 4.1 and 4.2 means that there is never a coalition of voters which can guarantee an outcome (k-tuple) that is better for all its members in case M k is used, i.e., if a feasible elimination procedure is used. This fact is certainly not shared by well-known existing methods. The following example illustrates this.
Example 4.4. Let A = {a, b, c, d}, N = {1, 2, 3}, and β(x) = 1 for all x ∈ A. Consider the profile R N given in the following table:
Suppose we have to select two candidates. In this case, M 2 is quite inconclusive: Brams and Fishburn, 2002) . According to STV, first d is eliminated, but thereafter either a or b or c is eliminated. For instance, if a is eliminated, then next b is chosen and finally c, so that in our notation the pair (c, b) results. This way, we obtain 
In fact, under STV the core for the profile in this example (which is a slightly modified version of the Condorcet paradox) is empty. It is easy to see that the same example applies to methods like plurality voting or run-off elections, assuming that in case of ties we can choose arbitrarily between tied alternatives, as in STV or feasible elimination procedures.
A method for computing M k in polynomial time
The following lemma was proved in Peleg (1984, Lemma 5.3 .5) for the case k = 1. Lemma 5.1 can be used to determine if an alternative (x m−k+1 , . . . , x m ) of A k is in M k (R N ), as follows. We define a bipartite graph with the voters of N as vertices on one side, and for every y ∈ A\{x m } we take β(y) vertices on the other side. For every vertex corresponding to an alternative y ∈ A\{x m−k+1 , . . . , x m }, we let there be an edge between this vertex and the vertex corresponding to a voter i if and only if x j R i y for every j = m − k + 1, . . . , m. For every vertex corresponding to an alternative x for some ∈ {m − k + 1, . . . , m}, we let there be an edge between this vertex and the vertex corresponding to a voter i if and only if x j R i x for all j > . Then, by Lemma 5.1, (x m−k+1 , . . . , x m ) ∈ M k (R N ) if and only if there is a matching for this graph with the property that all vertices corresponding to alternatives in A \ {x m } are matched. (Note that this matching is perfect if and only if y∈A\{xm} β(y) = n, in which case also all voter vertices are matched.) Clearly, such a matching must be maximal and the problem of finding a maximal matching is polynomial (see Hopcroft and Karp, 1973) . Repeating the foregoing procedure m(m − 1) · · · (m − k + 1) times is still polynomial (in m and n). 7
Concluding remarks
We have shown in this paper that the method for choosing k out of m, based on feasible elimination procedures, has the core property for two intuitive preferences extensions (Theorems 4.1 and 4.2). Unfortunately, as the following example shows, this result does not extend to all reasonable preference extensions.
Example 6.1. Let A = {w, x, y, z}, N = {1, . . . , 5}, β(w) = β(x) = 1, and β(y) = β(z) = 2. Consider the profile R N given in the following {5}; x) . We show that (w, x) = C(E M 2 ,R N ) where, for each i ∈ N ,R i is the lexicographic preference extension obtained by first comparing best alternatives and then second best alternatives. Consider the following profile for the coalition {1, . . . , 4}:
